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I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, the federal government's approach to regulation of
hospitals and other healthcare providers asks them to do more with
less. Both the government and private insurers have increasingly
assigned hospitals and other providers with financial responsibility for
1761
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the quality of the care they provide to federal beneficiaries.' At the same
time, experts predict that reimbursement rates by both the government
and private insurers will fall as a result of the Affordable Care Act's
recent efforts to increase access to healthcare. Facing a widening gap
between expectations of quality and availability of financial resources,
healthcare providers will need to pursue innovative business solutions
that allow them to reduce their costs without negatively affecting the
quality of their services.3
In a free market, the disruption associated with increased
accountability for sellers is not a problem in and of itself. Indeed,
market disruption can incentivize development of novel solutions to
1. See Sylvia M. Burwell, Setting Value-Based Payment Goals, NEW ENG. J. MED., (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056/NEJMp1500445 [http://perma.cc/NM8W-D6R7]
(announcing the intention of HHS "to have 85% of all Medicare fee-for-service payments tied to
quality or value by 2016, and 90% by 2018"); Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape:
Pay-For-Performance, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2014/03/04/the-payment-reform-landscape-pay-for-nperformance/ [http://perma.cc/KN9M-
TZ89] (describing the general structure of pay-for-performance reimbursement models, in which
payment to providers is partially based upon attainment of certain quality benchmarks).
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(seeking to increase access to healthcare services by mandating that individuals purchase health
insurance); see also M.P. McQueen, Less Choice, Lower Premiums, MOD. HEALTHCARE, (Aug. 17,
2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130817/MAGAZINE/3081799
2 1
[http://perma.cc/T6G2-V2XM] (noting the industry expectation that reimbursement rates by
private payers will begin to fall towards Medicare reimbursement levels in coming years).
3. This Note refers frequently to "innovative" or "novel" business arrangements as an
important way for providers to meet increasing quality expectations in the midst of declining
reimbursement from both private and public payors. These references are meant to include
arrangements that are nominally prohibited under the anti-kickback statute but that pose
relatively low risk of fraud or abuse and would be able to provide significant cost-savings to
producers without compromising the quality of care provided to patients.
Examples of such arrangements are as infinite as the imaginations of healthcare business
leaders. One helpful example is the possibility of establishing "preferred hospital" networks by
Medigap plans-that is, private insurers who cover Medicare beneficiaries' deductible payments-
whereby hospitals would discount Medigap policy beneficiaries' deductible payments in exchange
for "in-network" status. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG
Advisory Opinion No. 15-05, at 2-3 (Apr. 29, 2015) (discussing one such arrangement). Although
technically violative of the anti-kickback law, these arrangements can be valuable tools for
hospitals to attract new patients and for Medigap insurers to increase access to their coverage by
using the savings to reduce the cost of coverage. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Serys., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 15-09, at 2-3 (July 23, 2015) (discussing a Medigap
plan's program to pass along savings associated with preferred hospital arrangements to
beneficiaries in the form of premium discounts for using in-network hospitals). And if these
arrangements are structured to avoid restricting beneficiaries' ultimate choice of hospital and to
allow any hospital to participate, the risk of quality-based decisionmaking and anti-competitive
activity seem to be of little concern. See id. (discussing the importance of these features in Medigap
preferred hospital networks). Thus, such arrangements would be termed innovative and novel
since they promise to reduce the costs of and increase access to health care services without
compromising the quality of the services provided. For additional examples of "innovative"
business arrangements, see Part II.B.2.
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longstanding problems. However, such policy shifts can lead to market
failure when they occur in an industry that is subject to broad
restrictions on the types of business arrangements into which parties
may voluntarily enter. This is so because such restrictions often
substantially reduce firms' abilities to pursue novel means of
production and organization in response to the market disruption.
Healthcare is just such an industry. The federal anti-kickback
statute ("AKS") and related statutes impose severe liability upon
parties who enter into arrangements involving the exchange of any type
of remuneration for the referral of beneficiaries of federal healthcare
entitlement programs.4 This rule is intended to prevent the corruption
of providers' medical judgment by economic considerations.5 Indeed,
there are many shocking examples of doctors compromising their
professional judgment for personal profit.6 However, this rule can be
particularly troublesome in cases involving less morally repugnant
conduct because of the role referrals play in the healthcare industry.
Indeed, without referrals, specialists and other ancillary providers
would have few patients and, by extension, little revenue or profit.7
Thus, if providers are unable to exchange remuneration for referrals in
order to grow their businesses, many firms may be unable to cover the
expenses associated with their quality-of-care responsibilities.8
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). The AKS broadly defines "remuneration" to include
kickbacks, bribes, or rebates paid "directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind." §
1320a-7b(b). The term "refer" is used in the AKS, but is never defined; it has been held to include
both direct requests made to a provider for a specific type of service as well as formulation or
approval of a plan of care that will require provision of a specific type of service. See, e.g., United
States v. Patel, 17 F. Supp. 3d 814, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that physician-defendant's
recertification of a patient's need for home health services constituted a referral within the
meaning of the AKS).
5. See Patel, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 826 (noting that the "overarching purpose" of the AKS is to
prevent healthcare fraud, increased costs to Medicare and Medicaid, and the misuse of federal
funds).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1990) (involving a
"disreputable medical clinic" that billed Medicaid for unnecessary blood tests performed on drug
addicts in exchange for prescriptions for controlled substances).
7. See Ateev Mehrotra, Dropping the Baton: Specialty Referrals in the United States, 89
MILBANK Q. 39, 40 (2011) (describing the robust role of referral to the specialty physician practice).
8. Faced with such a proscription, a rational firm might still choose to violate the statute if
the marginal benefits of a forbidden arrangement exceeded the marginal cost, opting to pay any
resulting penalties out of the marginal profits flowing from the arrangement (call this "efficient
fraud"). However, that option is effectively shut off under the AKS because the penalties for
violation are so large that it is difficult to imagine any arrangement where the resulting increase
in profits would be greater than the penalties associated with violation of the statute. The
possibility of criminal sanction also confounds such an economic analysis. For a discussion of the
phenomenon of efficient fraud in the context of contract law, see Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial
Representation: Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOy. L.A. L. REV.
1017, 1023 (2003).
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However, not all of the arrangements within the AKS's broad
prohibition are harmful. Accordingly, a number of statutory and
regulatory exceptions to AKS liability permit providers to pursue
certain categories of otherwise-prohibited arrangements. Under the
AKS regime, two types of exceptions can confer providers with
immunity from the strictures of the AKS: safe harbor provisions and
advisory opinions. Safe harbor provisions are generally applicable
exceptions to the AKS's broad prohibition on the exchange of
remuneration for referrals.9 Such provisions are preferable for
arrangements that are categorically "prosocial"10-that is,
arrangements that exert neither upward pressure on cost, nor
downward pressure on quality-because these generally applicable
exceptions provide the industry with much-needed certainty about
which types of business arrangements will give rise to AKS liability.
Unfortunately, both Congress and the Department of Health & Human
Services ("HHS") have been loath to create additional safe harbor
provisions despite dramatic legislative and economic changes within
the healthcare industry over the past five years." This governmental
reluctance to promulgate additional safe harbors creates a significant
barrier to providers who seek to cope with increased financial pressures
by entering into innovative business arrangements.
Luckily, providers are not foreclosed from pursuing innovative
business arrangements simply because they are unable to secure
passage or promulgation of new, generally applicable safe harbor
provisions. Providers may alternatively resort to the advisory opinion
process to insulate themselves from administrative sanctions
associated with violation of the AKS. Under that process, providers may
petition the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") within HHS for case-
specific exceptions from AKS liability. 12 In contrast to HHS's reluctance
to promulgate safe harbors, OIG consistently grants favorable advisory
9. These provisions insulate from prosecution certain types of conduct that would otherwise
be violations of the statute, but do not constitute the type of conduct targeted by Congress's trong
policy preference against healthcare entitlement fraud. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (statutory safe
harbor provisions); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2015) (regulatory safe harbor provisions).
10. The term "prosocial" is used here to refer to arrangements that exert neither upward
pressure on cost, nor downward pressure on quality.
11. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(representing a major legislative overhaul of the domestic healthcare delivery system). Although
twenty-five regulatory safe harbors currently exist, none have been promulgated since the passage
of the ACA. The last new regulatory safe harbor was promulgated in 2007. Safe Harbor for
Federally Qualified Health Centers Arrangements Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 72 Fed. Reg.
56,632, 56,632 (Oct. 4, 2007) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 130a-7d(b) (obliging the Secretary of HHS to issue written advisory
opinions as to whether a proposed arrangement involves prohibited remuneration or inducement
under the AKS).
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opinions so long as the proposed arrangement "contains limitations,
requirements, or controls that give adequate assurance that Federal
health care programs cannot be abused."13
While the advisory opinion process ensures providers have some
means of obtaining legal cover for a given business arrangement short
of a generally applicable safe harbor, this process is not a perfect
substitute for such safe harbors. First, advisory opinions are only
binding upon HHS and the requesting party.14 To that end, a provider
that received a favorable advisory opinion could still face both criminal
and civil liability under the AKS and the False Claims Act ("FCA"),
respectively.'5 And even if the sheer number of favorable advisory
opinions for a given type of arrangement makes prosecution unlikely,
requiring specific permission to enter into a specific type of business
arrangement still fails to create the complete certainty that
accompanies a generally applicable safe harbor.16 Second, securing an
advisory opinion can be expensive since the requesting party is
responsible for paying the costs associated with drafting the opinion. 17
And while some firms may be willing to pay the cost in exchange for the
certainty of HHS's treatment, more dost-conscious providers may find
themselves unable to pursue an otherwise prosocial business
arrangement.
HHS could solve these seeming problems with the advisory
opinion process by codifying the standards it applies to individual
applications for advisory opinions into generally applicable safe
harbors.8 To appropriately guard against undue risk of fraud or abuse,
13. Issuance of Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,313 (July 16, 1998)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008). Indeed, since the advent of the advisory opinion power in 1997,
OIG has issued 314 opinions, 84% of which were favorable to the requesting party. See infra Part
III.B (presenting empirical findings regarding OIG's exercise of the advisory opinion power).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A) (2012) ("Each advisory opinion issued by the Secretary
shall be binding as to the Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion.").
15. The advisory opinion process only insulates covered parties from administrative
sanctions by HHS. It does not protect them against civil or criminal enforcement by the
Department of Justice. See 2 AM. HEALTH LAWYERS AsS'N, HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 36:115
(2015) ("[T]he Department of Justice is not bound by OIG advisory opinions.").
16. Cf. Dale F. Rubin, Private Letter and Revenue Rulings: Remedy or Ruse, 28 N. KY. L. REV.
50, 56 (2001) (discussing the lower deference accorded to IRS private letter rulings).
17. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-129, MEDICARE: ADVISORY OPINIONS AS
A MEANS OF CLARIFYING PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 13 (2004) (describing the expenses that
providers must bear to secure an advisory opinion).
18. HHS recently recognized the value of its experience in the advisory opinion process in a
slightly different context. In explaining its rationale for proposing a safe harbor for cost-sharing
waivers for emergency ambulance services, HHS noted that such arrangements had been the
subject of numerous favorable advisory opinions over a period of several years. Revisions to Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements and Gainsharing, 79Fed. Reg. 59,717, 59,720-21 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014).
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this would only be appropriate after HHS had gained sufficient
experience with a given arrangement within the advisory opinion
process to be convinced that it is generally prosocial.
This course of action would simultaneously benefit providers
and the public at large. Providers would benefit from the certainty of
the government's treatment of their business ventures and from the
elimination of the expenses associated with obtaining an advisory
opinion whose result is almost guaranteed in light of the government's
past treatment of identical arrangements. Similarly, this policy would
benefit the public in terms of both reduced costs and increased access
to care by allowing providers to pursue novel arrangements with other
providers that enable them to provide services more efficiently.19 The
approach proposed here might be thought of as a "laboratory of
regulation" permitting HHS to "test out" the appropriateness of certain
types of arrangements on a case-by-case basis before promulgating a
uniform safe harbor from AKS liability.
This Note suggests that OIG should remedy the shortcomings of
the advisory opinion process and the AKS regime generally by treating
advisory opinions as a proving grounds for certain types of innovative
business arrangements prior to the promulgation of generally
applicable safe harbors. Part II parses the intricacies of the AKS regime
and posits a theoretical explanation for HHS's historic unwillingness to
promulgate new regulatory safe harbors. Part III examines the advent
of the advisory opinion power and analyzes the exercise of that power
in practice. Finally, Part IV proposes that HHS should promulgate
regulatory safe harbors for certain categories of arrangements that
have been the subject of uniformly favorable advisory opinions over a
sufficiently long period of time. A brief conclusion follows.
A notable difference between this safe harbor and those proposed in this Note is that the advisory
opinions cited found that these types of arrangements were not even technically violative of the
AKS-that is, they involved no prohibited remuneration in the first place. See Office of Inspector
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-14, at 6 (concluding that
such arrangements do not generate "prohibited remuneration" under the AKS). While the
recognition of the value of the advisory opinion process as a laboratory of regulation is an
important step, this Note goes a step farther and suggests that HHS promulgate safe harbors for
certain types arrangements that are granted favorable advisory opinions despite the fact that they
are technically violative of the AKS. See infra Part 1V.
19. See supra note 3 (providing a working definition of "novel" business arrangements for
purposes of this Note).
[Vol. 68:6:17611766
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II. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND THE
LAW OF REGULATORY INERTIA
A. The Federal Anti-kickback Regime
Congress and HHS have honed the AKS to prevent corruption of
the professional judgment of physicians and other providers by
economic influences.20 To that end, Congress drafted the statute as a
broad prohibition on certain types of business arrangements to be
tailored by narrow safe harbor provisions immunizing specific types of
otherwise-prohibited conduct.21 In this way, the statute inverts the
usual presumption in American law that "everything that is not
forbidden is permitted" by declaring an extremely broad category of
healthcare business arrangements illegal unless a specific statutory or
regulatory safe harbor expressly protects that conduct.22
In relevant part, the AKS forbids the knowing or willful
solicitation or receipt of "any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind" in exchange for referral of a patient for services reimbursable
under a federal healthcare entitlement program.23 Violation of this
statutory prohibition constitutes a felony punishable by up to five years
in prison and substantial criminal fines.24 In addition to criminal
prosecution directly under the AKS, the government may also enforce
the AKS in a civil suit under the FCA and in an HHS administrative
proceeding.25
20. See James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is "Fraud" in the Health Care Industry?, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25 (noting that the AKS was "designed to eliminate incentives for the
overutilization of services").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2014).
22. See John Laws, The Rule of Reason-An International Heritage, in 2 JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 247, 256 (Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2000)
(describing the traditional English law presumption that individuals' actions are legal absent "a
settled prohibitory rule" to the contrary).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A); see supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining the
terms "referral" and "remuneration"). The AKS also forbids the solicitation or receipt of
remuneration in exchange for "purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item" reimbursable under federal
healthcare entitlement programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
25. Upon finding that a provider has violated the AKS, HHS may exclude the provider, impose
civil monetary penalties, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (exclusion); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (civil
monetary penalties). Similarly, providers who submit claims for payment to the federal
government for services rendered in violation of the AKS can be held civilly liable for a penalty of
between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim and treble damages under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1);
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (deeming knowing submission of a claim for services rendered in violation
of the AKS to be a false claim for purposes of the FCA).
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In order to establish the requisite intent to prove a violation of
the AKS, the prosecution need only show that "one purpose" of the
remuneration at issue was to induce referrals of Medicare or Medicaid
patients.26 It is no defense that inducement of referrals was not the
principal (or even a significant) purpose of the remuneration so long as
sufficient evidence suggests that it was one of the purposes of the
remuneration.27
However, the mere fact that a given transaction runs afoul of the
broad prohibitions of the AKS does not mean that liability is inevitable.
Indeed, if a given business arrangement falls squarely within a safe
harbor provision, then the arrangement will not give rise to AKS
liability.28 As of this writing, there are thirty-five such safe harbor
provisions (ten statutory and twenty-five regulatory) that shield certain
business arrangements from AKS liability under specific, narrow
circumstances.29 While an exhaustive discussion of all thirty-five safe
harbors is beyond the scope of this Note, a few examples of business
arrangements that have been found to merit a safe harbor include
certain profit-sharing arrangements between group practice
members,30 payments made to providers based on risk-sharing
agreements with managed care organizations, 3 and payments made to
26. E.g., United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the inducement
element of the AKS statute is satisfied so long as "one purpose" of a payment is to induce
Medicare/Medicaid referrals, even if that is not the "primary" purpose of the payment).
27. Id. Recognizing that providers rarely make business decisions without considering the
potential referral value of the decision, at least one court applying the one-purpose test has
attempted to draw a line between a "purpose" to induce referrals and a mere "collateral hope" that
a transaction will result in referrals. See United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834-35
(suggesting evidence of a mere hope or anticipation of referrals that would flow from a transaction
alone is not enough to prove sufficient intent to induce referrals under Greber's reading of the
AKS).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3); § 1320a-7d(a) (requiring the Secretary to solicit proposals
for new regulatory safe harbor provisions annually and to promulgate additional safe harbors "as
appropriate").
29. For a listing of the ten statutory safe harbors currently in effect, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(b)(3). For a listing of all twenty-five regulatory safe harbors currently in effect, see 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952 (2010). The Secretary of HHS has also issued notices of proposed rulemaking for four
additional safe harbor provisions. Revisions to Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and
Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements and Gainsharing, 79 Fed. Reg.
59,717, 59,719 (proposed Oct. 3, 2014) (proposing to protect certain cost-sharing waivers,
remuneration between federally qualified health centers and Medicare Advantage organizations,
discounts on drugs furnished under the Medicare Coverage Gap Discount Program, and local
transportation services). For a proposal advocating for a safe harbor provision for "harmless
remunerations" which do not increase cost or reduce quality, see generally Cameron T. Norris,
Comment, Reviving Hanlester Network: A Safe Harbor for Harmless Remunerations Under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 137 (2014).
30. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(p).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(t).
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patient referral services made exclusively on the basis of the cost of
operating the services.32
While Congress retains power to create safe harbor provisions
by statute, it also granted the Secretary of HHS broad authority to
promulgate additional regulatory safe harbors in consideration of
various criteria specified in the enabling legislation.33 Yet despite
HHS's broad authority to promulgate safe harbor regulations and
significant changes in the healthcare industry since Congress's passage
of the ACA, the agency has declined to promulgate additional
regulatory safe harbors in recent years. Indeed, as of this writing, the
agency had not promulgated any new regulatory safe harbors since
2007.34
The regulatory structure underlying the AKS has been the
subject of widespread criticism in both academia and the healthcare
industry. Some commentators have decried the statute as overly broad
because its prohibition reaches not only the "raw fraud" that seems to
be the subject of congressional ire,35 but also "technical fraud" that does
not appear to constitute fraud in any ordinary legal use of the term and
that may in fact be value maximizing.36 Other scholars go so far as to
argue that this broad prohibition on conduct functions to "stunt[ I the
development of organized medical systems" in a way that is
"threatening both to conventional practices and innovative business
arrangements" in the healthcare industry because of its tendency to
discourage the pursuit of novel, value-maximizing business
arrangements.37
32. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(f).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a) (establishing the relevant criteria for HHS consideration when
deciding whether to promulgate a given regulatory safe harbor).
34. See Safe Harbor for Federally Qualified Health Centers Arrangements Under the Anti-
Kickback Statute, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,632, 56,632 (Oct. 4, 2007) (protecting certain arrangements in
which individuals or entities donate goods, items, or services to qualifying health centers) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
35. For example, billing for services that were unnecessary, of inferior quality, or never
rendered. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1990) (involving a
"disreputable medical clinic" that billed Medicaid for unnecessary blood tests performed on drug
addicts in exchange for prescriptions for controlled substances).
36. For example, payments made in good faith for services of merchantable quality when
such payment is made in exchange for referrals amounts to fraud under the AKS, but would not
be construed as fraud in any general sense of the word. For a critical discussion of the AKS's
expansion of the definition of fraud in the healthcare industry, see CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 458-59 (2d ed. 1999).
37. Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn't Worked, 101 GEO.
L.J. 519, 567 (2013); Mark A. Hall, Making Sense ofReferral Fee Statutes, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 623, 624 (1988); see also supra note 3 (providing a working definition and examples of of
"novel" and "innovative" business arrangements for purposes of this Note).
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Some commentators argue that the traditional practice of
prosecutorial discretion is enough to ensure that only truly fraudulent
activities are subject to prosecution under the AKS. 38 This argument,
however, is unavailing. Although the AKS itself does not expressly
create a private cause of action for violation thereof, private individuals
may enforce the strictures of the AKS through the qui tam provisions
of the False Claims Act ("FCA"). 39 As a result, any reliance on
prosecutorial discretion as a mechanism to avoid AKS liability in cases
involving purely technical fraud is illusory because private individuals
remain free to press such claims without the consent of the executive,
so long as they qualify as a relator under the FCA.40 Thus, reliance on
prosecutorial discretion is an inadequate solution to the problem of the
overly broad nature of the AKS's prohibitions.41 For this reason, it is
even more important to ensure that safe harbor provisions covering
prosocial business arrangements are promulgated as soon as
practicable in order to ensure that the healthcare industry can take
advantage of the benefits of such arrangements without fear of the
possibility of AKS liability.
B. Regulatory Safe Harbors
Regulatory safe harbor provisions are essential components of
the AKS regime because they ensure that the breadth of the statute's
prohibition does not stifle necessary and prosocial business
arrangements in the healthcare industry. By permitting HHS to
independently promulgate safe harbor provisions, Congress intended
that the agency would use its expertise to protect business
arrangements that would not create undue risk of fraud or abuse, even
38. See Scott J. Kelly, Comment, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996: A Medicare Fraud Advisory Opinion Mandate Sends the Inspector General "Shopping for
Hats", 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 321 (1998) (suggesting that the binding advisory opinion process
inappropriately forces OIG to pick and choose between various modes of agency action and that it
is an inappropriate tool to clarify the strictures of the AKS).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) (permitting individuals to bring qui tam suits to enforce the
FCA); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012) (expressly providing that providers who render in violation
of the AKS may be prosecuted under the qui tam provisions of the FCA).
40. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (establishing the qualifications in order for a relator to bring a
qui tam action to enforce the AKS via the FCA).
41. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 224-25 (1996) (comparing
the current system of enforcement to a Prohibition-era speakeasy because prosecutorial discretion
insulates technically illegal conduct from liability so long as the enforcement authorities view it
as "harmless," and noting that the questionable predictability of such a system is further
undermined by the possibility of qui tam actions, which are not policed against even a
harmlessness tandard).
[Vol. 68:6:17611770
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though they involved an exchange of remuneration for referrals.42
Despite the importance of this portion of the AKS regime and dramatic
changes in the healthcare industry since the passage of the ACA, HHS
has not promulgated a new safe harbor provision in over seven years.43
This Section first discusses the various values at play when HHS
contemplates promulgation of a new safe harbor provision. It then
explores a theoretical explanation for HHS's recent failure to act.
1. Competing Values in Safe Harbor Development
The AKS, by virtue of its extremely broad prohibition on
economic conduct that would be altogether appropriate in other
markets, provides insight into the difficult task before Congress to root
out fraud in federal healthcare programs. The subjects of congressional
ire that instigated the passage of the AKS-that is, raw fraud and
corruption of medical judgment-are exceedingly difficult to define in a
way that is not dramatically over- or underinclusive.44 Faced with this
dilemma, Congress opted to adopt an overinclusive definition to be
narrowed by statutory and regulatory safe harbors.45 Although safe
harbors can unlock otherwise inaccessible efficiency gains, the decision
to use a safe harbor to tailor the broad prohibition of the AKS should
not be made lightly. Indeed, safe harbors can also create loopholes
through which crafty providers can perpetrate frauds under color of
law. 4 6 As such, the decision to enact a given safe harbor provision should
42. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 84 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1865, 1884-85 (noting the advisory opinion power's role in supporting providers' attempts "to
structure new and innovative health care delivery systems to contain health care cost").
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (observing that HHS last promulgated a new
safe harbor regulation in 2007). While HHS has tweaked the safe harbors since, their changes
have taken the form of amendments to existing safe harbor regulations. See Electronic Health
Records Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,202 (Dec. 27, 2013)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (amending an existing regulatory safe harbor governing payments
made to providers related to electronic health records systems). A proposal to amend the
gainsharing safe harbor provision is also outstanding at time of writing. Revisions to Safe Harbors
under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary
Inducements and Gainsharing, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,717 (Oct. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts.
1001, 1003).
44. See Blumstein, supra note 20 (discussing the many faces of fraud in the healthcare
industry and the shortcomings of the definition adopted the AKS).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012) (establishing the AKS's broad prohibition and carving
out several specific statutory safe harbors).
46. For example, a hypothetical safe harbor for payments in exchange for referrals for
medically necessary services would certainly cover some merely technical fraud, but might also
cover arrangements involving raw fraud where the referral was made on the basis of the payment
and not the provider's medical judgment.
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always involve a detailed assessment of the potential risks and
anticipated benefits.
The benefits that accrue from promulgation of safe harbor
provisions are clear: providers can tap into potential efficiencies
associated with certain business arrangements that are not otherwise
permissible under the AKS. 4 7 And in a healthcare market facing
increasing pressure to reduce costs, these cost reductions have the
potential not only to reduce skyrocketing prices, but also to allow firms
to stay in business.48 Moreover, promulgating a safe harbor for
arrangements that constitute the only method of conferring certain
benefits upon consumers may yield consumer surplus by reducing
prices, increasing quality, increasing access to care, or a combination of
all three.49
In addition to the benefits that flow generally from the
promulgation of appropriate safe harbor provisions, further benefits
would accrue if HHS were to issue safe harbors to cover arrangements
that have received uniformly favorable treatment in the advisory
opinion process. First, promulgating safe harbors to cover
arrangements that are uniformly approved in the advisory opinion
process would provide greater legal certainty about the arrangements.
The safe harbors would ensure that the parties to the arrangement
could not be prosecuted by any governmental agency (as opposed to
protecting them exclusively from HHS administrative sanctions) since
the arrangement would no longer be a violation of the AKS at all.5 0
Second, the procedural requirements associated with amending a
generally applicable safe harbor would provide additional protection to
parties who have already received favorable treatment in the advisory
opinion process. Unlike repeal of a generally applicable regulatory safe
harbor, which requires compliance with the procedural requirements
47. For example, if physicians did not have the benefit of the safe harbor enabling them to
invest in a group practice, they would be unable to tap the cost-saving efficiencies associated with
shared office space and staff. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.9 52 (p) (2015) (establishing the group practice
investment safe harbor).
48. See supra Section II.B for discussion of the importance of ensuring firms have the ability
to pursue novel and innovative methods of providing care in view of new cost and quality pressures.
49. For example, HHS has promulgated broad-based waivers of AKS liability for accountable
care organizations (ACOs) out of recognition that these arrangements (although technically
violative of the AKS) can spin off substantial benefits if they are legal. Final Waivers in Connection
With the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,993 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
ch. V). For a full discussion of the benefits and risks that accrue to both consumers and the
healthcare industry as a result of ACOs, see Elliott S. Fisher et al., A Framework For Evaluating
the Formation, Implementation, and Performance Of Accountable Care Organizations, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 2368, 2368-70 (2012).
50. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (noting that advisory opinions are binding
upon HHS, but not upon other governmental agencies).
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for notice-and-comment rulemaking,51 revocation or termination of a
favorable advisory opinion merely requires notice to the affected parties
of the change in circumstances upporting the government's threatened
action and an adequate opportunity for the affected parties to respond.
52
Finally, codification of generally applicable safe harbors covering
arrangements uniformly approved in the advisory opinion process
reduces the cost of entering into such an arrangement by providing free
immunity from prosecution (as opposed to requiring providers to foot
the bill for potentially expensive advisory opinions).53 These savings
could then be passed onto consumers. When combined with the
increased legal certainty associated with a generally applicable safe
harbor, these cost savings would incentivize parties to invest more
heavily in value-maximizing, covered arrangements without fear of
unexpected enforcement action.
Despite the many benefits of issuing safe harbor provisions for
apparently beneficial arrangements, there are also significant costs.
First and foremost, a poorly drafted or improvidently granted safe
harbor provision can provide legal cover to a scheme to defraud federal
healthcare entitlement programs.4 Given the robust policy preference
51. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring agencies engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking to
issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, solicit public comments on the proposed Rule, and
promulgate of a Final Rule indicating their reasoning); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983) (holding that arbitrary and capricious review
applied to agency decisions to rescind regulations and that it required the agency to establish on
the record "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made").
52. 42 C.F.R. § 1008.45(a) (2015) (establishing the procedural requirements for termination,
revocation, and modification of OIG advisory opinions). Notably, OIG has (and has exercised) the
legal authority to terminate an advisory opinion. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Final Notice of Termination of OIG Advisory Opinion No. 11-18, at 1 (Apr. 8,
2014) (terminating an advisory opinion because OIG no longer believed that the factors cited in
the original opinion provided sufficient controls to "mitigate against the risk that the discount
could be an improper payment to induce referrals").
53. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 14 (discussing the cost of OIG
advisory opinions issued as of December 2004).
While some may argue that issuing a generally applicable safe harbor after a number of
providers have invested the funds to secure favorable advisory opinion results in a sort of forfeiture
to the providers who initially sought the opinion, this view ignores the fact that they were able to
take advantage of the otherwise-inaccessible fficiencies available under the arrangement while it
was being "tested out" by HHS/OIG. Additionally, the first-movers gain the benefit of the certainty
associated with being completely insulated from AKS liability by any governmental actor (as
opposed to being insulated from administrative enforcement actions by HHS, but not from civil
and criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice). See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text.
54. Imagine that the safe harbor covering agreements with patient referral services did not
contain the requirement that payments be related exclusively to the cost of operating the service
and instead allowed the payments to be made on the basis of the profitability of the patients
referred. In such a case, providers would be able to short-circuit the foundational purpose of the
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against submission of fraudulent or abusive claims on federal
healthcare dollars,55 HHS should ensure that it bases its decisions to
promulgate safe harbor regulations on a sufficient body of proof that an
arrangement will not result in fraud or abuse in practice. In this way,
HHS is correct to initially review certain types of high-risk
arrangements on a case-by-case basis by means of the advisory opinion
power.56 Indeed, to promulgate generally applicable safe harbors for
such arrangements would be unduly risky and would likely exceed
HHS's delegated authority to promulgate regulatory safe harbors.5 7
However, after OIG has determined and consistently applied a set of
criteria that describe a subclass of an otherwise-suspicious category of
arrangements-namely, those that are worthy of legal protection and
are approved without incident over a long enough period of time-the
risk of fraud or abuse in fact would seem to be extremely low.
Any decision regarding whether to promulgate a safe harbor for
a given set of business arrangements should be rooted in an analysis of
both the costs and benefits associated with promulgating such a rule.5 8
However, empirical evidence described in Part III of this Note suggests
that HHS may not be properly balancing these costs and benefits in
light of its failure to promulgate regulatory safe harbors for
arrangements that receive consistently favorable treatment in the
advisory opinion process.59 The following Section argues that there is a
point in time where the social benefit of the "regulatory flexibility"
retained by HHS by reviewing certain arrangements on a case-by-case
basis within the advisory opinion process no longer exceeds the social
cost of the agency's decision to withhold the certainty associated with a
AKS simply by engaging a patient referral service (as opposed to seeking referrals from a
physician).
55. See supra Section II.A (discussing the structure of the AKS); infra Section III.A
(discussing the legislative history behind the advisory opinion power).
56. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 01-14, at 5-6 (Sept. 4, 2001) (discussing OIG's general concern with cost-savings
sharing plans between hospitals and physicians).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a)(2) (2012) (specifying the criteria for HHS to consider when
promulgating a regulatory safe harbor).
58. Id. (requiring HHS to consider the extent to which a given regulation would impact the
potential for overutilization of services, but also the extent to which the regulation would impact
competition among healthcare providers).
59. Indeed, this behavior suggests that HHS may not be properly considering the benefit
that certainty with respect to the legality of a given arrangement hat would accrue to regulated
individuals and firms as a result of formal promulgation of HHS's policy regarding such
arrangements. See supra Section II.B (discussing the benefits that safe harbor treatment provides
to regulated parties).
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generally applicable safe harbor covering those same arrangements.
60
It is precisely at this point that HHS should promulgate its standard
approach to a given type of arrangement as a generally applicable safe
harbor.61
2. The Law of Regulatory Inertia
Faced with the problem of HHS's recent regulatory inaction, the
first logical inquiry is: why has HHS failed to actively exercise its power
to promulgate regulatory safe harbor provisions to ensure providers
have adequate latitude to pursue value-maximizing transactions? Any
answer is necessarily speculative, but the mere existence of the
question brings us to the topic of regulatory inertia.
Regulatory inertia is a descriptive theory aiming to explain why
agencies fail to promulgate or amend regulations within their discretion
when such a regulation would appear to benefit the public.62 The
potential reasons supporting an agency's decision not to promulgate an
apparently beneficial regulation are numerous. Indeed, scholars have
attempted to explain this agency behavior with theories ranging from
agency capture63 to the growing prioritization of "regulatory flexibility"
in administrative law.6 4
The cause of the regulatory inertia that plagues the development
of new regulatory safe harbor provisions is not entirely clear, but one
explanation may be that it is the result of an abundance of caution
about declaring potentially fraudulent arrangements legal given the
extreme cost such a decision may impose on federal entitlement
60. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing regulatory flexibility and the problem of regulatory
inertia).
61. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1407-09 (2011)
("[Liaw seeks to optimize its social returns by conducting its productive efforts at the time when
its inputs are least costly and its decision will be most valuable.").
62. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Advice and Consent: An Alternative Mechanism for Shareholder
Participation in the Nomination and Election of Corporate Directors, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO
THE CORPORATE BALLOT 7,14 (Lucian Bebchuk ed., 2004):
Experience teaches that regulations are subject o a variant of Newton's First Law of
Mechanics, also known as the Law of Inertia: A regulation, once adopted, stays adopted,
even if its costs exceeds its benefits, unless it is acted upon by a sufficiently powerful
political force-which is a rare event indeed.
63. See Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest
Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 103,
114-17 (2006) (suggesting such decisions are largely influenced by either formal or informal
pressure from interest groups).
64. See Super, supra note 61, at 1382 (suggesting that a desire to preserve "regulatory
flexibility" by delaying decision on whether or not to promulgate a given rule is a significant cause
of agency inaction and regulatory inertia in cases involving complex regulations with potentially
high social costs).
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programs.65 Even if a given regulation only conferred one percent of
purportedly fraudulent billing activity with legal cover, that regulation
would effectively impose a cost on federal entitlement programs of
between $300 million and $980 million each year.66 Because of the high
cost of an ill-advised safe harbor, HHS justifiably seeks to accumulate
as much information as possible regarding the risks and potential
benefits of any given business arrangement, both in theory and in fact,
before it decides whether to promulgate a given safe harbor provision.67
As discussed at greater length below, the advisory opinion power
provides HHS with a valuable way to accumulate this type of record of
proof without committing to a potentially costly, generally applicable
safe harbor provision.
However, HHS has failed to promulgate even one new safe
harbor within the last seven years, even though certain types of
arrangements have been the subjects of uniformly favorable treatment
within the advisory opinion process over the same interval.68 Professor
David Super suggests hat this type of agency behavior may be rooted
in an agency's desire to maintain flexibility to change its position on a
given arrangement if confronted with conflicting evidence regarding the
possibility of fraud or abuse.69 According to Professor Super, an agency
facing a shortage of relevant information has three possible options: (1)
it can promulgate a regulation despite having imperfect information by
either "paying the required premium" to obtain perfect information or
by "producing a lower-quality decision" on the basis of imperfect
65. Although HHS does not publish any estimate of the proportion of Medicare and
Medicaid's combined $1 trillion in expenditures that is the result of fraudulent billing practices, a
landmark 2012 study suggested that anywhere from 3-9.8% (i.e., between $30 and $98 billion) of
such spending is attributable to fraud. See CENTERS OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
NATIONAL HEALTH ExPENDITURES 2013 HIGHLIGHTS 2, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-
data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddatadownloads/
highlights.pdf [http://perma.ccIU5KE-D59W]; Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth,
Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1513, 1514 (2012).
66. See Berwick & Hackbarth, supra note 65, at 1514 (estimating that between $30 billion
and $98 billion of annual Medicare and Medicaid payments involve fraudulent behavior by the
provider).
67. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the quantity of information required
before HHS is willing to make the policy decision regarding whether or not to create a safe harbor
combined with the heavy focus on enforcement of the AKS may lead regulators "to delay difficult
policy decisions in the hopes that the desired results instead may be achieved through the litigation
process." Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12 J.L. & POL'Y
55, 136-37 (2003).
68. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing two types of arrangements that have not been
protected by generally applicable safe harbors despite receiving uniformly favorable treatment in
the advisory opinion process over significant periods of time without subsequent issuance of a
favorable advisory opinion).
69. Super, supra note 61, at 1382.
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information, (2) it can completely refrain from taking any regulatory
action at all, or (3) it can delay its regulatory action until perfect
information is available.70 Professor Super proposes that an undue
prioritization of flexibility has caused many agencies to opt for the third
option by delaying decisions on important regulatory actions because of
a shortage of information.7 1 However, this dilatory approach imposes
substantial costs upon the public. Making a decision on the basis of
imperfect information, he argues, is often preferable to waiting for
perfect information because the "benefits of new information or other
important resources" are often less than the "costs of [a] decrease[ ] in
the ... value of the decision rendered."72
This logic is particularly relevant with respect to the AKS since
its structure forecloses a vast swathe of valuable business
arrangements that are available to firms in virtually every other
industry. The information available to HHS in support of new safe
harbor provisions will almost always be lacking since there is no way to
know with absolute certainty how a given safe harbor will function in
reality. As such, the relevant question should be whether the benefit of
better information outweighs the costs borne by the industry and
society at large as a result of the lack of a relevant safe harbor.7 3 This
Note argues that when the answer to this question is yes, HHS should
promulgate a safe harbor provision on the basis of existing, albeit
imperfect, information.74
III. A DREAM DEFERRED: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
ADVISORY OPINION PROCESS IN PRACTICE
The power to issue advisory opinions is commonly vested within
federal administrative agencies, especially when an agency oversees an
area governed by a particularly complex statutory or regulatory
regime.7 5 This power is most often delegated to such agencies so that
they can clarify the meaning and applicability of statutes and
70. Id. at 1380.
71. Id. at 1382.
72. Id.
73. Examples of such costs include higher supply and lower prices flowing from efficiencies
that might otherwise flow from foreclosed business relationships.
74. While this determination is essentially a matter of policy discretion, there is certainly a
point at which the incremental value of the information gleaned from additional favorable advisory
opinions based on the same criteria as the other opinions provides so little additional information
as to make promulgation of a safe harbor a no-brainer. For a discussion of arrangements
approaching that point, see infra Part IV.




regulations to given sets of circumstances at the request of private
parties. While advisory opinions are usually not legally binding upon
the agency,76 Congress has granted a small number of administrative
agencies the power to issue advisory opinions that carry the force of
law.7 7 One such agency is HHS.78 This Part explores the history of the
HHS advisory opinion power and how OIG has exercised it over the past
two decades.
A. The Purpose of the OIG Advisory Opinion Power
Congress granted OIG the power to issue legally binding
advisory opinions regarding the applicability of certain provisions of the
AKS through the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA"). 79 HIPAA is best known for its delegation of authority
to HHS to promulgate standards governing the use and distribution of
patients' healthcare information. More relevant to this Note's inquiry,
however, the legislation also vested OIG with the power to issue binding
advisory opinions as to the meaning of "prohibited remuneration" for
purposes of the AKS and as to whether a given arrangement constitutes
a violation of the AKS.80
This provision was the topic of substantial debate in both
Congress and the public square. Most of the debate centered on the
impact that such a process would have on the government's ability to
prosecute fraud and abuse effectively.
Within Congress, the House Committee on Ways and Means
endorsed the provision, reasoning:
Providers want to comply with the fraud and abuse statute, but many are unsure of how
the statute affects them. These providers should be able to receive guidance from the
government regarding financial arrangements. Little or no guidance is currently provided
because there are no regulations and only insufficient safe harbors. Without this ability,
76. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1.3 ("Any advice given by the Commission is without prejudice to the
right of the Commission to reconsider the questions involved and, where the public interest
requires, to rescind or revoke the action.").
77. Such opinions are typically only binding with respect o the party requesting the opinion
or identically situated parties, and only so long as all of the material facts are included within the
request for an opinion. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c) (providing for binding effect of an FEC advisory
opinion on the party seeking the opinion as well as parties engaged in activities "indistinguishable"
from the activities addressed in an advisory opinion). For a description of situations in which
agencies are empowered to waive statutory or regulatory requirements for all parties governed
thereby, see David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
272-90 (2013).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4) (2012).
79. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 205, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936, 2001-02 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)).
80. Id. § 205(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320-7d(b)(2)).
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a chilling effect is placed on legitimate arrangements, particularly when providers are
attempting to structure new and innovative health care delivery systems to contain health
care cost.8 1
In response to that argument, certain dissenting committee members
voiced concern that the bill as recommended would substantially hinder
OIG's ability to prosecute healthcare fraud by "creating an
unprecedented advisory opinion mechanism for criminal and certain
other intent-based statutes."82 Despite the controversy surrounding the
provision, Congress's intent can be discerned from: the relevant
legislative history, the fact that Congress refused to remove the
advisory opinion provision despite certain legislators' concerns, and the
overwhelming margin with which HIPAA was passed. These all suggest
that Congress intended the advisory opinion power to provide OIG with
substantial flexibility to accommodate "new and innovative health care
delivery systems to contain health care cost" through case-specific
exceptions to AKS liability.83
HIPAA's advisory opinion provision also spurred debate outside
Congress. The debate was essentially between two competing
conceptions of the advisory opinion process: The first viewed it merely
as a mechanical tool to assess the existence of liability under the statute
and existing safe harbors on a given set of facts. The second viewed it
primarily as a tool to create case-specific safe harbor provisions to
protect prosocial, but technically violative, business arrangements from
AKS liability.
June Brown Gibbs, the then-sitting Inspector General of HHS,
championed the first view. With respect to the proposed advisory
opinion power, she argued that "[a]dvisory opinions on intent-based
statutes (such as the anti-kickback statute) are impractical if not
impossible" because of the difficulty of assessing intent on the paper
record accompanying a request for such an opinion.84 By centering the
inquiry upon the intent element of the AKS, proponents of the first view
conceptualize the advisory opinion as a preemptive decision regarding
the legality of a given arrangement on the basis of existing law without
81. H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 84 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1884-
85.
82. Id. at 279, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1985.
83. Id. at 85, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1885.
84. Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of the Dep't or Health & Human
Servs., to Sen. Tom Harkin (Sep. 29, 1995), in 141 CONG. REC. S15158, S15159 (1995); see also
Kelly, supra note 38, at 318-21 (1998) (summarizing congressional and governmental concerns




consideration of whether the existing legal protections ought to be
expanded.
Scholars espousing the second, contrary view defend the
advisory opinion power in light of its ability to "reestablish[] the rule of
law" by providing a "case-by-case opportunity for the government to
determine what structures and organizations are beneficial." These
scholars also defend the advisory opinion power as a tool to clarify the
outer boundaries of the general applicability of the AKS. 85 This camp's
approach conceptualizes advisory opinions as case-specific safe harbors
capable of insulating otherwise-illegal arrangements from AKS liability
when a generally applicable safe harbor would be inappropriate due to
HHS's lack of experience with a given type of arrangement.
The second camp's view that the advisory opinion should be used
as a tool to define the outermost contours of the AKS finds further
support in the regulatory preamble to the final rule establishing the
administrative requirements governing the advisory opinion process.86
In that document, OIG described its conception of the advisory opinion
power as a tool to create "case specific" safe harbor provisions when the
benefit or practicability of a "generalized" safe harbor is unclear.87 The
Office further explained its view of the purpose of the advisory opinion
process:
The statutory and regulatory safe harbors to the anti-kickback statute describe
generalized, hypothetical arrangements that are protected. In contrast, an advisory
opinion is a means of relating the anti-kickback statute . .. to the facts of a particular
arrangement. There are likely to be factors that make some specific arrangements
appropriate for a favorable advisory opinion, even in subject matter areas where a
generalized safe harbor may be impractical. Thus, we believe that particularized or "case
specific" safe harbor treatment is appropriate where the specific arrangement contains
limitations, requirements, or controls that give adequate assurance that Federal health
care programs cannot be abused.
8 8
Under this formulation of the advisory opinion power, OIG is
empowered to grant favorable advisory opinions not only to proposed
arrangements that squarely comply with the requirements of the AKS,
but also to arrangements that constitute technical violations of the
AKS, so long as they "contain[ I] limitations, requirements, or controls
that give adequate assurance that Federal health care programs cannot
85. E.g., James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1996, at 118, 126.
86. Issuance of Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311 (July 16, 1998) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008).
87. Id. at 38,313.
88. Id. at 38,314.
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be abused."8 9 This conception of the advisory opinion power provides
OIG with a flexible tool to gain experience with novel business
arrangements and assess the wisdom of new, generally applicable safe
harbor provisions to cover such arrangements.9 0 In this way, the
advisory opinion power might be thought of as a tool to overcome
regulatory inertia by providing HHS with the means to acquire
additional information to support the agency's decision on whether to
promulgate a generally applicable safe harbor.9 1
The first camp's arguments that such use of the advisory opinion
would exceed OIG's delegated authority because it would expressly
authorize actions otherwise "contrary to law" are of little force. This is
especially so in light of HHS's broad power to craft generally applicable
safe harbor provisions and Congress's specific intent that the advisory
opinion power be used as a flexible tool to encourage providers to
"structure new and innovative health care delivery systems to contain
health care cost."9 2 Moreover, the straightforward structure of the fraud
and abuse statutes-that is, broad prohibitions on conduct that may
only be excused by falling squarely within a safe harbor provision or
exception-suggests that advisory opinions would amount to little more
than surplusage. This is so because of the ease with which counsel can
determine the availability of a safe harbor on the facts of any given
case.93 Thus, the relevant legislative history, the fact that Congress
refused to remove the advisory opinion provision despite the concerns
voiced by certain legislators, the overwhelming margin with which
HIPAA passed, and a functional reading of the provision creating the
89. Id. For a recent example of an opinion in which OIG authorized an arrangement despite
the fact that it would have constituted a violation of the AKS if the requisite intent to induce
referrals had existed, see Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG
Advisory Opinion No. 14-10, at 2 (Oct. 21, 2014) ("[Allthough the Proposed Arrangement could
potentially generate prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute if the requisite
intent to induce or reward referrals of Federal health care program business were present, [OIG]
would not impose administrative sanctions ... in connection with the Proposed Arrangement.").
90. This type of system would drastically reduce the social cost of "testing out" potential safe
harbor provisions by confining any potentially deleterious effects on the healthcare system to a
single provider. Conversely, as more and more of a similar type of arrangement demonstrate
success in reducing cost and increasing quality, HHS would be able to build up a valuable record
of demonstrated success with a given type of arrangement o support any future efforts to create
a generalized statutory or regulatory safe harbor or exception provision.
91. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
92. H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 84 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1885;
see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(2) (2012) (providing that OIG should use advisory opinions to
determine whether certain conduct "constitutes grounds for imposition of sanctions" under the
fraud and abuse laws, not to determine whether certain conduct constitutes a violation of the laws).
93. The straightforward, elements-based structure of the safe harbors makes it relatively
easy to determine whether a given arrangement would fall within the protection of the relevant
safe harbor.
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advisory opinion power all suggest that Congress sought to provide
HHS with an additional tool to define the outer boundaries of AKS
liability even when there was no generally applicable safe harbor on
point.
B. The OIG Advisory Opinion Power in Practice
While Congress may have intended the advisory opinion to be a
laboratory of regulation to test and validate the appropriateness of safe
harbor provisions for certain types of business arrangements,94 a
critical analysis reveals that HHS has never taken the next step of
promulgating generally applicable safe harbors to cover arrangements
receiving uniform approval within the advisory opinion process.95 This
Section summarizes empirical findings that OIG has consistently used
the advisory opinion power to define the outer bounds of AKS liability
by authorizing providers to enter into otherwise-impermissible
arrangements when such arrangements are likely to be prosocial. It
then notes that HHS has failed to use the advisory opinion as a
laboratory of regulation, as evidenced by the agency's failure to adopt
safe harbors to cover certain types of arrangements that have received
uniformly favorable treatment in the advisory opinion process.
1. Advisory Opinions as Case-Specific Safe Harbors
In the seventeen years since OIG began issuing advisory
opinions regarding AKS liability, it has issued 326 such opinions.96 The
number of opinions issued each year has fluctuated from six in 1997 to
twenty-six in 2010 (the year in which the ACA was passed).97 Of these
326 opinions, 273-or 84%-were at least partially favorable to the
94. Concerned with the potential "chilling effect" that the AKS may bear on "new and
innovative health care delivery systems" in light of the need to "contain health care costs," it seems
clear that Congress intended that the advisory opinion power was to be used as a sort of laboratory
of regulation to give HHS and OIG a sufficient basis of experience with novel arrangements to
make an informed decision about whether the potential efficiencies available outweigh the risk of
fraud and abuse in fact. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-496, pt. 1, at 84 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1884-85.
95. See infra Section III.B.1.
96. The statistics presented in the following paragraphs are the result of an empirical
analysis conducted by the author of all of the advisory opinions that have been issued by OIG from
the advent of the power in 1997 until September 5, 2015. For a complete listing of those opinions,
see Advisory Opinions, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://oig.hhs.gov/complianceladvisory-opinions/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) [http://perma.ccl2U47-
2MA5].
97. Id.
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party who requested the opinion.9 8 The remaining 52 opinions resulted
in a declaration that the proposed arrangement involved prohibited
remuneration, which could lead to AKS liability if the requisite intent
to induce referrals were present.99
There is some controversy regarding the extent to which the
advisory opinion process has been used to confer immunity upon
potentially beneficial arrangements that constitute technical violations
of the AKS.100 However, an empirical assessment of the outcomes of the
process shows that OIG has actually been largely willing to grant
favorable advisory opinions to insulate novel arrangements from AKS
liability, so long as the arrangements contain adequate safeguards
against fraud and abuse. As such, OIG appears to be exercising its
advisory opinion power in a fashion consistent with the enacting
Congress's intent.101
To evaluate the validity of criticisms that the advisory opinion
process has not been used as a tool to authorize arrangements that are
otherwise impermissible under the AKS, this author reviewed all 273
favorable advisory opinions issued since 1997 and sorted them into two
categories: (1) opinions whose result was compelled by a preexisting
interpretation of the AKS or an existing safe harbor, and (2) opinions
whose result diverged from the negative result that OIG acknowledged
would generally be compelled by the statute. This determination was
made on the basis of OIG's reasoning within the opinion. If OIG stated
its conclusion was compelled because the arrangement did not offend
the prohibitions of the statute or because the arrangement fell squarely
within an existing safe harbor provision, it was sorted into the first
category.102 The remaining opinions were sorted into the second
category because OIG granted a favorable opinion despite its
98. Data aggregated and analyzed by the author (on file with author). To be classified as a
favorable or partially favorable opinion, the requesting party must have received a case-specific
immunization from administrative sanction for at least one of the arrangements they submitted
to OIG for review.
99. Data aggregated and analyzed by the author (on file with author); see also supra note
26-27 (discussing the intent requirement under the AKS).
100. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES,
AND QUESTIONS, 123-24 (Supp. 2007) (citing OIG's approach in Advisory Opinion 07-02 as
evidence of a broader hostility toward "market-oriented competition").
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-14, supra note 18, at 6 (Oct. 22, 2013) ("[Tlhe
Proposed Arrangement would not generate prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback
statute.").
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recognition that the conduct would otherwise constitute a violation of
the statute if the requisite intent to induce referrals were present.
103
As an initial matter, OIG has issued a relatively consistent
number of advisory opinions each year-between ten and twenty-six
per year-since its assumption of the power in late 1997.104 If OIG were
generally declining to exercise its power to confer immunity upon
prosocial arrangements despite the fact that they constitute technical
violations of the AKS, one would expect the proportion of opinions in
the second category to be relatively low. Similarly, if OIG were actively
exercising its power to achieve that end, we should expect a higher
proportion of the opinions to be included in the second category. After
tabulation, the results indicate that a staggering 82.8% of the 273
favorable advisory opinions fell into the second category.105 In other
words, favorable opinions were issued for 226 arrangements despite the
fact that they would have constituted technical violations of the AKS if
the parties had the requisite intent to induce referrals. As
demonstrated in Figure 1 below, this approach has been employed
consistently since the advent of the advisory opinion power.
Figure 1: Proportion of Favorable and Unfavorable Advisory
Opinions in Cases Without Controlling Authority
103. E.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 14-10, supra note 89 ("[Although the Proposed
Arrangement could potentially generate prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute
if the requisite intent to induce or reward referrals of Federal health care program business were
present, [OIG] would not impose administrative sanctions .. . in connection with the Proposed
Arrangement.").
104. Data aggregated and analyzed by the author (on file with author).
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This finding is strong evidence that OIG has exercised its
advisory opinion power in a manner consistent with the enacting
Congress's intent that the opinions be used as "case-specific" safe
harbors for arrangements that contain "limitations, requirements, or
controls that give adequate assurance that Federal health care
programs cannot be abused."106 While some commentators have cited
negative responses to specific requests for advisory opinions as evidence
of a shifting focus away from the advisory opinion as a tool to create
"case-specific" safe harbors, the evidence above certainly calls that
claim into question. To the contrary, OIG has consistently provided
legal cover to novel arrangements that would have otherwise violated
the strictures of the AKS, so long as these arrangements contained
adequate controls to reduce the risk of fraud and abuse.107 In short, an
exhaustive analysis of existing advisory opinions suggests that OIG has
made real efforts to give effect to the congressional intent that the
advisory opinion power be used as a tool to create case-specific safe
harbors as opposed to a tool to apply the existing law to the facts of a
given case.
2. The Advisory Opinion Process as a Laboratory of Regulation
In contrast to the OIG's success in giving effect to congressional
intent surrounding advisory opinions as case-specific safe harbors, HHS
has failed to use its experience with these case-specific safe harbors as
a basis for promulgating generally applicable safe harbor provisions to
provide cover for similarly prosocial arrangements.108 Indeed, it has
been more than seven years since HHS has promulgated a new
regulatory safe harbor despite the fact that OIG has uniformly granted
favorable advisory opinions to providers seeking to enter into certain
types of business arrangements during that same period (and beyond).
106. Issuance of Advisory Opinions by the OIG, 63 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,314 (July 16, 1998)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008). My analysis merely confirms that favorable opinions are being
issued to arrangements that might otherwise constitute technical violations of the AKS. A detailed
analysis of the adequacy of OIG's evaluation of the limitations, requirements, and controls within
each proposal would be necessary to determine that these decisions are appropriate as a matter or
policy.
107. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 100 at 123-24 (citing OIG's approach in Advisory
Opinion 07-02 as evidence of a broader hostility toward "market-oriented competition"). It is
important to note that the claims that certain requests for favorable advisory opinions were
unwisely denied by OIG remain justifiable; I merely take issue with the use of those anecdotes as
evidence that OIG has veered away from its policy of using the advisory opinion power to create
case-specific safe harbors (as opposed to merely applying the law to the facts).
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (indicating Congress's intent that the advisory
opinion process be used to foster "new and innovative health care delivery systems").
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As discussed earlier, this course of behavior has real costs because it
denies providers the increased legal certainty associated with generally
applicable safe harbors'09 and deprives consumers of the lower prices
and increased access that flow from allowing providers to unlock the
value and efficiencies associated with novel business arrangements.110
Several types of novel business arrangements remain
impermissible under the AKS despite years of uniformly favorable
treatment within the advisory opinion process. Two useful examples
are: (1) arrangements involving the use of a "preferred hospital" as part
of a Medicare Supplemental Health Insurance ("Medigap") policy, and
(2) savings sharing arrangements between hospitals and physician
groups."' Indeed, regulatory action on these (and other)11
2 types of
arrangements seems appropriate because favorable advisory opinions
have been invariably granted to such arrangements, so long as they
meet the criteria specified in the relevant standards. The criteria in
these standards could serve as a blueprint for the relevant regulatory
language.113
In 2007, OIG issued its first advisory opinion on an arrangement
between a network of hospitals and a Medigap plan.11
4 In that opinion,
OIG reviewed the plan's proposal to contract with various hospital
networks for a discount on the inpatient deductibles incurred by its
members at those hospitals.115 OIG ultimately opined that it would not
109. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of generally
applicable safe harbors to both providers who already have advisory opinions as well as those who
do not).
110. See supra notes 47-49 (discussing the price reductions associated with safe harbors
generally).
111. E.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 14-10, supra note 89, at 2-3 (preferred hospital
arrangement); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 09-06, at 4-7 (June 30, 2009) (shared savings arrangement).
112. Similar clusters of favorable advisory opinions have been issued without any generally
applicable regulatory action for arrangements involving exclusive agreements for the provision of
ambulance services to municipalities, charitable contributions to defray out-of-pocket costs for
financially needy individuals, and provision of complimentary insurance preauthorization services
by various specialty group practices. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-13, at 1-3 (Oct. 15, 2013) (arrangement involving
provision of free dental services to children with demonstrated financial need when such services
were otherwise billable to Medicare[Medicaid); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-05, at 1-3 (June 21, 2013) (exclusive ambulance
services arrangement); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG
Advisory Opinion No. 12-10, at 1-3 (Aug. 30, 2010) (preauthorization services arrangement).
113. These arrangements are provided only as illustrative examples; many other types of
arrangements have received equally permissive treatment by OIG.
114. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 07-15 (Dec. 10, 2007).
115. Id. at 2.
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impose administrative sanctions upon either party in connection with
the proposal even though the arrangement "could potentially generate
prohibited remuneration under the AKS, if the requisite intent to
induce or reward referrals of Federal healthcare program business were
present." In support of its decision, OIG reasoned that favorable
treatment was warranted because the arrangement posed a "low risk of
fraud or abuse" and had the potential to accrue "significant savings for
beneficiaries."116 OIG cited four factors supporting its conclusion: (1) the
discounts would not increase or affect per-service Medicare payments,
(2) the discounts were unlikely to increase utilization (since they would
have been effectively invisible to patients who would have already
purchased coverage from the plan), (3) the discounts were unlikely to
unfairly affect competition among hospitals since membership in the
network was open to substantially all accredited hospitals, and (4) the
discounts were unlikely to affect professional medical judgment since
no remuneration would have been received by physicians and the
patient was free to go to any hospital without incurring additional out-
of-pocket expense.'17
Since issuing that favorable opinion, OIG has issued sixteen
additional advisory opinions on similar arrangements-all favorable.1 8
Moreover, all of the sixteen arrangements proposed after the initial
favorable opinion was issued in 2007 were assessed against
substantially the same criteria used in the 2007 opinion.19 Indeed,
many of the subsequent opinions not only employ the same standard of
decision, but also contain largely identical "Analysis" sections.120 Taken
collectively, the uniformly favorable treatment of such arrangements
upon satisfaction of the criteria discussed above over a period of seven
years suggests that HHS is largely comfortable with such arrangements
in both theory and practice.
116. Id. at 2, 5.
117. Id. at 4-5.
118. Data aggregated and analyzed by the author (on file with author).
119. E.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 11-19, at 4-6 (Dec. 20, 2011). Beginning in 2013, OIG began considering whether the
plan expressly disclosed to plan members "that they have the freedom to choose any hospital
without incurring additional liability or penalty." See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-01, at 4 (Mar. 26, 2013). However, it is
unclear whether that requirement is necessary for issuance of a favorable opinion going forward.
See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-
12, at 5-6 (Aug. 27, 2013) (granting a favorable advisory opinion without consideration of such
disclosures); Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 13-06, at 4-7 (June 27, 2013) (same).
120. Compare OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-15, supra note 114, at 4-5, with OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 13-12, supra note 119, at 5-6.
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Moreover, it seems unlikely OIG would continue to grant
favorable opinions on the basis of the same standard if it were
uncomfortable with the effects of arrangements previously approved
under that standard. Put another way, the marginal benefit of any
additional information gained from additional testing of these Medigap
plan-preferred network arrangements in the regulatory laboratory of
the advisory opinion process is likely minimal when compared with the
potential financial benefits associated with generally applicable
protection for this type of arrangement.121 Thus, this type of
arrangement appears to be a strong candidate for a generally applicable
regulatory safe harbor under Professor Super's framework, since the
marginal benefit of additional information is small and the marginal
benefit of regulatory action is high.
OIG has accorded similarly favorable treatment to
arrangements involving payment of a certain portion of the savings
arising from a physician group's implementation of cost-reduction
measures. In 2001, OIG issued a favorable advisory opinion regarding
a hospital's proposal to pay a surgical group practice a share of the cost
savings achieved by the hospital as a direct result of changes in the
practice style by the group practice's membership.122 Despite finding
that the arrangement might constitute a technical violation of the AKS,
OIG granted a favorable opinion, relying upon three criteria: First, the
arrangement limited the likelihood that it would be used to attract
referring physicians or to increase referrals from existing physicians by
limiting participation to physicians already on the hospital's medical
staff and capping the size of the maximum savings payment on the basis
of the previous year's admissions.123 Second, the structure of the
arrangement eliminated the risk that the payment would be used to
reward other physicians who refer patients to the physician group
because the physician group was comprised of physicians of a single
type of specialty, the payment would be divided equally among all
partners, and the agreement was only for a term of one year.124 Finally,
the arrangement set out with specificity the actions that would
generate the cost savings upon which the payment would be based, and
those actions were actual and appropriate changes in practice style.125
In view of the proposal's satisfaction of these criteria, OIG found that it
121. See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 13-01, supra note 119, at 5 (suggesting that these
arrangements are positioned to achieve "significant savings for beneficiaries").
122. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 01-1, at 3-6 (Jan. 18, 2001).
123. Id. at 12-13.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 13-14.
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"pose[d] a low risk of fraud or abuse," and held that it would not impose
administrative sanctions upon either party in connection with the
proposal.126
Since the issuance of the above-discussed opinion, OIG has
approved fourteen additional cost-savings sharing arrangements on the
basis of substantially the same factors.127 While OIG has expressed
doubts about arrangements that do not satisfy all of the above
criteria,128 those doubts should not serve as a disincentive to
promulgate a regulation protecting those arrangements that do. Indeed,
this is exactly the type of arrangement the narrowly written safe
harbors were designed to protect.
In light of the mounting pressure to reduce costs across the
healthcare industry, hospitals are desperate for tools to incentivize
physicians to reduce their expenses. Shared-savings arrangements
have proved to be a highly effective way to reduce healthcare costs
because they align physicians' incentives with hospitals'. Given that the
types of shared-savings arrangements discussed here have been
uniformly approved over the course of fourteen years, it seems likely
the benefit of any additional information to be gained from confining
such arrangements to the advisory opinion process is vanishingly
small. 129 On balance, at least under Professor Super's framework, these
factors weigh in favor of a move toward codifying the standard
discussed above as a generally applicable safe harbor.30
To summarize, an empirical examination of OIG's exercise of its
advisory opinion power suggests that Congress's will for the advisory
opinion remains half-fulfilled. OIG has unquestionably given effect to
the congressional intent that the advisory opinion process be used to
create case-specific safe harbors for otherwise-violative arrangements.
This success is evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of favorable
126. Id. at 14.
127. E.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, supra note 111, at 11-13. Certain cost-savings
sharing arrangements have been decided under different standards, but this is attributable to the
different structures of the arrangements at issue. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 12-22, at 12-14 (Oct. 30, 2012); Office of Inspector
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-16, at 8-11 (Oct. 14,
2008).
128. E.g., Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Advisory Opinion
No. 05-01, at 13 (Feb. 4, 2005) (noting OIG's "concerns regarding many arrangements between
hospitals and physicians to share cost savings").
129. This seems especially true given the thirteen years of experience HHS has with such
arrangements.
130. Super, supra note 61, at 1407-09. Indeed, so long as the safe harbor provision is drafted
narrowly, HHS can maintain flexibility to approve or sanction cost-savings sharing plans that do
not fall squarely within the narrow category of acceptable arrangements.
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opinions cover arrangements that, according to OIG, would otherwise
constitute technical violations of the AKS. 13 1 At the same time, the
evidence also suggests that HHS has failed to give effect to Congress's
desire that the advisory opinion be used as a laboratory of regulation in
support of additional regulatory safe harbors.13 2 While this policy of
inaction may be a result of a desire to maintain "regulatory flexibility,"
the following Part argues that such a policy-in addition to being
contrary to Congress's intent-unduly prioritizes the value of flexibility
at the expense of benefits to be achieved from the certainty of generally
applicable safe harbors.
IV. OVERCOMING REGULATORY INERTIA: USING THE DATA
ASSEMBLED IN THE LABORATORY OF REGULATION
HHS's decisions regarding whether to promulgate a regulatory
safe harbor to cover a specific type of business arrangement-as
opposed to confining the arrangement o the case-by-case analysis of
the advisory opinion process-may be properly thought of as decisions
on the extent to which the agency wishes to maintain "regulatory
flexibility" to prosecute similar arrangements under the AKS.133 In fact,
HHS has specifically explained its failure to take formal action on at
least one safe harbor as the result of imperfect information.134 This Part
argues that this flexibility-maximizing approach is appropriate for new
arrangements with which HHS lacks experience, but not for
arrangements that receive consistently favorable treatment within the
regulatory laboratory of the advisory opinion process.
131. See supra Section III.B.1.
132. See supra notes 92, 94 (discussing Congress's desire for the advisory opinion process to
be used as a testing grounds for the appropriateness of generally applicable safe harbors to cover
novel business arrangements).
133. Promulgation of a safe harbor provision over a certain type of business arrangement can
be viewed as an effective surrender of the government's ability to prosecute individuals or
corporations for participating in such an arrangement since it functions as a perfect defense to
liability so long as the arrangement falls squarely within the provisions of the safe harbor. See
Super, supra note 61, at 1410:
A bright-line rule is easy to understand and inexpensive to apply, yet it almost
inevitably proves both over- and underinclusive. The antidote, we are told, is the
additional information that will become available if we reserve discretion until the
policy needs to be applied to particular cases. Although this may mean individual
adjudications in some cases, it also may mean acting legislatively on a class of cases
only when a decision becomes necessary . ...
134. See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, supra note 111, at 14 (noting that HHS's
failure to promulgate a generally applicable safe harbor for cost-savings sharing arrangements
between hospitals and physicians similar to the proposed arrangement is rooted in concerns about
cost-savings sharing arrangements generally).
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Applying the logic of Professor Super's article Against Flexibility
to the observed history of the advisory opinion process, this Note posits
that HHS has inappropriately postponed promulgation of generally
applicable safe harbors for arrangements that have received
consistently favorable treatment in the advisory opinion process over a
period of several years. Indeed, the benefits of regulatory action on the
basis of the imperfect information gleaned from the advisory opinion
process almost certainly outweigh the costs (including the risk of fraud
or abuse associated with the promulgation of safe harbor provisions on
the basis of incomplete or imperfect information).13 5 This Note argues
that HHS could increase social welfare by promulgating generally
applicable safe harbors for specific business arrangements that have
received uniformly favorable treatment within the advisory opinion
process, despite a shortage of information about the potential effects of
that decision.
At its core, this Note's general proposal is simple: HHS should
make use of the valuable information it gains about various types of
innovative business arrangements within the regulatory laboratory of
the advisory opinion process to promulgate generally applicable safe
harbors when the social benefits of the safe harbor outweigh the social
costs of regulating on the basis of the incomplete information gleaned
from the advisory opinion process. While the abstract nature of the costs
and benefits involved makes it difficult to specifically define this
standard, existing examples provide a helpful illustration.36
Certain categories of arrangements have received uniformly
favorable treatment within the advisory opinion process over large
spans of time and have proved unlikely to result in fraud or abuse in
practice.137 In such situations, this Note proposes that it is clear that
the benefits of a narrowly drafted safe harbor exceed the costs of
promulgating a safe harbor regulation on the basis of good, albeit
135. Id.; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the costs associated with
inappropriately granted or poorly drafted safe harbor provisions).
136. Indeed, it is exceedingly difficult to reliably quantify the cost of enacting a given rule on
the basis of imperfect information when that cost would flow directly from the creation of an
unforeseen loophole. Further, although we could calculate a first approximation for the benefits to
flow from the safe harbor on the basis of observed economies and savings flowing from the covered
arrangements, this too does not lend itself well to a mathematical definition of precisely when a
safe harbor regulation should be promulgated.
137. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. OIG's recent termination of a favorable
advisory opinion for an arrangement involving a technical violation of the AKS suggests that OIG
does monitor these arrangements for evidence of fraud or abuse in fact. See Notice of Termination
of OIG Advisory Opinion No. 11-18, supra note 52. The fact that all other favorable advisory
opinions covering technically violative arrangements have been left in place leads to the fair
inference that the agency does not believe the other covered arrangements have had the practical
effect of encouraging fraud or abuse.
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imperfect, information. The "preferred" arrangements between hospital
networks and certain Medigap insurance plans discussed in Part III are
one such example.138 Such arrangements have been granted favorable
advisory opinions consistently over the past seven years, and all
requests for advisory opinions for such arrangements have received
favorable results.139 Similarly favorable treatment has also been
accorded to arrangements for compensation plans between hospitals
and physician groups including a cost-savings sharing provision.140
There are other examples of arrangements receiving similarly favorable
treatment over long periods of time without any evidence of fraud or
abuse as well.141
Thus, although it is difficult to articulate a quantitative
standard for when a safe harbor for a given type of arrangement is
appropriate in view of the evidence gleaned through the advisory
opinion process, HHS should apply a qualitative standard that would
assess the benefit associated with promulgating a generally applicable
safe harbor on the basis of: (1) the number of existing arrangements
that have received favorable treatment, (2) the uniformity of such
favorable treatment when the relevant criteria are satisfied, and (3) the
amount of time that the relevant arrangements have been in place. If
all three factors are high-as with the examples discussed above-HHS
should promulgate a generally applicable safe harbor to cover similar
arrangements. This is so because the benefits of that action are most
likely higher than the costs of regulating with the incomplete
information gleaned from the advisory opinion process. In this way,
HHS could realign its exercise of the advisory opinion power with the
enacting Congress's intent that this power be used as a tool to foster
"new and innovative health care delivery systems."142
138. See supra Section III.B.2.
139. See id.
140. Such plans have been the subject of fifteen uniformly favorable advisory opinions over a
span of fourteen years. See supra Section III.B.2.
141. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
140. H.R. REP. No. 104-496, pt. 1, at 84 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1884-
85.
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V. CONCLUSION
Facing mounting cost, quality, and reimbursement pressures,
healthcare providers are in a difficult position. To adjust to these new
pressures, they will need to seek economies wherever they can be found.
Unfortunately, the rigid structure of the AKS restricts providers'
abilities to pursue innovative business arrangements. While HHS has
the power to promulgate regulatory safe harbors, it has been reluctant
to exercise that power of late. Congress, understanding the challenges
facing both the healthcare industry and HHS, conferred OIG with the
power to issue advisory opinions that would insulate recipient parties
from any administrative penalty associated with the proposed
arrangement.
An examination of OIG's exercise of its advisory opinion power
suggests that the Office has generally succeeded in implementing
Congress's intent that the power be used to grant case-specific safe
harbors for arrangements that would otherwise be technically violative
of the AKS. 143 However, HHS's history of using the advisory opinion
process as a regulatory laboratory to assemble a body of proof in support
of certain safe harbor provisions has been less successful.144
Thus, this Note ultimately proposes that HHS should use its
experience with novel arrangements in the advisory opinion process as
a basis for promulgating new safe harbor provisions when many similar
arrangements have received consistently favorable treatment over an
extended period of time.145 This use of the advisory opinion process as a
laboratory of regulation would allow HHS to give effect to Congress's
intent that the advisory opinion process be used to develop new safe
harbors to promote the efficient delivery of healthcare services. And
because those safe harbors would be promulgated on the basis of real-
world experience with similar arrangements, HHS would also be able
to guard against the real and worrisome risk of fraud or abuse in
practice.
143. See supra Section III.B. 1.
144. See supra Section III.B.2.
145. Both the examples of preferred arrangements between hospitals and Medigap plans and
cost-savings sharing arrangements between hospitals and physicians are examples of




Put simply, HHS has all the tools it needs to test out novel
business arrangements and to develop safe harbors that give providers
flexibility without creating undue risk of fraud and abuse. Now, all it
needs to do is use them.
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